Informationally Efficient Trade Barriers
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- Matthew F. Mitchell & Andrea Moro, 2006. "Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 387-393, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
Trade barriers; Distortionary policies;JEL classification:
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H - Public Economics
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-INT-2005-04-16 (International Trade)
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