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A short note on the prisoner’s dilemma as applied to public procurement

Author

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  • Claudio Weber Abramo

    (Transparencia Brasil)

Abstract

The prisoner’s dilemma is sometimes invoked to describe the situation facing participants in tenders. Reasoning on the basis of the dilemma metaphor, it is contended that agreeing not to bribe public officials in order to win contracts (collaboration) leads to better outcomes than bribing (confrontation). Here it is argued that the prisoner’s dilemma does not correspond to an adequate metaphor for public tenders. Incidentally, it is also argued that the assumption that bribery financially harms participants, which stimulates the allusion to the prisoner’s dilemma in the first place, is arbitrary.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Weber Abramo, 2003. "A short note on the prisoner’s dilemma as applied to public procurement," Public Economics 0310004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0310004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prisoner’s dilemma; public procurement;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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