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Challenges of China;s Economic System for Economic Theory

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  • Gregory C. Chow

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

The challenges in the market economy in China for economic theory touch on four topics: private versus public ownership of assets, Western legal systems versus Eastern European semiformal legal systems, individualism versus the collective good, and multiparty versus one party political systems. I came in contact with these issues while advising the government of Taiwan in the 1960's and 1970's, and the government of mainland China in the 1980's and 1990's.y

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory C. Chow, 2003. "Challenges of China;s Economic System for Economic Theory," Microeconomics 0306002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0306002
    Note: Published AER Vol 87, No 2, pp 321-327
    as

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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/0306/0306002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Microeconomics;

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • F49 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Other
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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