Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure in the Repeated Game
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Normann, Hans-Theo, 2009.
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- Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Upstream Collusion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_30, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Pedro Mendi, 2009. "Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 95-112, March.
- Pedro Mendi, 2005. "Vertical Integration, Collusion Downstream, and Partial Market Foreclosure," Faculty Working Papers 17/05, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
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More about this item
Keywords
foreclosure; vertical integration; collusion;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2004-09-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2004-09-05 (Microeconomics)
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