IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpex/0306001.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Don't Let Your Robots Grow Up To Be Traders: Artificial Intelligence, Human Intelligence, and Asset-Market Bubbles

Author

Listed:
  • Ross M. Miller

    (Miller Risk Advisors)

Abstract

Researchers who have examined markets populated by "robot traders" have claimed that the high level of allocative efficiency observed in experimental markets is driven largely by the "intelligence" implicit in the rules of the market. Furthermore, they view the ability of agents (artificial or human) to process information and make rational decisions as unnecessary for the efficient operation of markets. This paper presents a new series of market experiments that show that markets populated with standard robot traders are no longer efficient if time is a meaningful element, as it is in all asset markets. While simple two- season markets with human subjects reliably converge to an efficient equilibrium, markets with minimally intelligent robot traders fail to attain this equilibrium. Instead, these markets overshoot the equilibrium and then crash below it. In addition to firmly establishing the role of trader intelligence in asset-market equilibrium, these experiments also provide insights into why bubbles and crashes are consistently observed in many asset-market laboratory experiments using human subjects.

Suggested Citation

  • Ross M. Miller, 2003. "Don't Let Your Robots Grow Up To Be Traders: Artificial Intelligence, Human Intelligence, and Asset-Market Bubbles," Experimental 0306001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0306001
    Note: Type of Document - PDF/Acrobat; prepared on Windows 98SE; to print on PDF compatible; pages: 18 ; figures: Included
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/exp/papers/0306/0306001.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Antoni Bosch-Domenech & Shyam Sunder, 2000. "Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 16(3), pages 257-284, December.
    2. Lei, Vivian & Noussair, Charles N & Plott, Charles R, 2001. "Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 831-859, July.
    3. Ross M. Miller & Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith, 1977. "Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 91(4), pages 599-624.
    4. Caginalp, Gunduz & Porter, David & Smith, Vernon, 2000. "Momentum and overreaction in experimental asset markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 187-204, January.
    5. Mirowski,Philip, 2002. "Machine Dreams," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521772839, October.
    6. Shyam Sunder & MODELS A, 2002. "Markets as Artifacts: Aggregate Efficiency from Zero-Intelligence Traders," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm284, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2004.
    7. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(3), pages 322-322.
    8. Mirowski,Philip, 2002. "Machine Dreams," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775267, October.
    9. Ross M. Miller, 2002. "Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?," Experimental 0201001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jan 2002.
    10. Carl Chiarella & Giulia Iori, 2002. "A simulation analysis of the microstructure of double auction markets," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(5), pages 346-353.
    11. Van Boening, Mark V & Wilcox, Nathaniel T, 1996. "Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 461-477, June.
    12. John Duffy & M. Ünver, 2006. "Asset price bubbles and crashes with near-zero-intelligence traders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 537-563, April.
    13. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of the "Hayek Hypothesis"," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(2), pages 165-179, April.
    14. Smith, Vernon L & Suchanek, Gerry L & Williams, Arlington W, 1988. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1119-1151, September.
    15. Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Price formation in double auction markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1307-1337, August.
    16. Miller, Ross M & Plott, Charles R, 1985. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 837-872, July.
    17. Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-137, February.
    18. Duffy, John, 2006. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 949-1011, Elsevier.
    19. Williams, Arlington W, 1980. "Computerized Double-Auction Markets: Some Initial Experimental Results," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(3), pages 235-258, July.
    20. Porter, David P & Smith, Vernon L, 1995. "Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset Markets," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(4), pages 509-541, October.
    21. LeBaron, Blake & Yamamoto, Ryuichi, 2007. "Long-memory in an order-driven market," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 383(1), pages 85-89.
    22. Steven Gjerstad & Jason Shachat, 2003. "The Edgeworth exchange formulation of bargaining models and market experiments," Microeconomics 0304004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. HIGASHIDA Keisaku & TANAKA Kenta & MANAGI Shunsuke, 2018. "Losses on Asset Returns Caused by Perception Gaps of Fundamental Values: Evidence from laboratory experiments," Discussion papers 18008, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    2. Svitlana Galeshchuk, 2017. "Technological bias at the exchange rate market," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(2-3), pages 80-86, April.
    3. Ross M. Miller, 2012. "The Effect Of Boundary Conditions On Efficiency And Pricing In Double‐Auction Markets With Zero‐Intelligence Agents," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 179-188, July.
    4. Da Costa, Newton & Goulart, Marco & Cupertino, Cesar & Macedo, Jurandir & Da Silva, Sergio, 2013. "The disposition effect and investor experience," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1669-1675.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Duffy, John, 2006. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 949-1011, Elsevier.
    2. Baghestanian, Sascha & Walker, Todd B., 2015. "Anchoring in experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 15-25.
    3. Katerina Sherstyuk & Krit Phankitnirundorn & Michael J. Roberts, 2021. "Randomized double auctions: gains from trade, trader roles, and price discovery," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1325-1364, December.
    4. Jakob Grazzini, 2013. "Information dissemination in an experimentally based agent-based stock market," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 8(1), pages 179-209, April.
    5. Chen, Shu-Heng, 2012. "Varieties of agents in agent-based computational economics: A historical and an interdisciplinary perspective," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25.
    6. Baghestanian, S. & Lugovskyy, V. & Puzzello, D., 2015. "Traders’ heterogeneity and bubble-crash patterns in experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 82-101.
    7. Gode, Dhananjay (Dan) K. & Sunder, Shyam, 2004. "Double auction dynamics: structural effects of non-binding price controls," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1707-1731, July.
    8. John Duffy & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Asset Price Bubbles and Crashes with Near-Zero-Intelligence Traders: Towards an Understanding of Laboratory Findings," Computational Economics 0307001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2004.
    9. Ross M. Miller, 2012. "The Effect Of Boundary Conditions On Efficiency And Pricing In Double‐Auction Markets With Zero‐Intelligence Agents," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(3), pages 179-188, July.
    10. Palan, Stefan, 2010. "Digital options and efficiency in experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 506-522, September.
    11. César Martinelli & Jianxin Wang & Weiwei Zheng, 2023. "Competition with indivisibilities and few traders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(1), pages 78-106, March.
    12. Martin Barner & Francesco Feri & Charles R. Plott, 2005. "On the microstructure of price determination and information aggregation with sequential and asymmetric information arrival in an experimental asset market," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 73-107, January.
    13. Lu, Dong & Zhan, Yaosong, 2022. "Over-the-counter versus double auction in asset markets with near-zero-intelligence traders," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    14. Te Bao & Elizaveta Nekrasova & Tibor Neugebauer & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2022. "Algorithmic trading in experimental markets with human traders: A literature survey," Chapters, in: Sascha Füllbrunn & Ernan Haruvy (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Finance, chapter 23, pages 302-322, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Ross M. Miller, 2002. "Can Markets Learn to Avoid Bubbles?," Experimental 0201001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jan 2002.
    16. Makarewicz, Tomasz, 2021. "Traders, forecasters and financial instability: A model of individual learning of anchor-and-adjustment heuristics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 626-673.
    17. Halim, Edward & Riyanto, Yohanes Eko & Roy, Nilanjan, 2016. "Price Dynamics and Consumption Smoothing in Experimental Asset Markets," MPRA Paper 71631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Lucy F. Ackert & Narat Charupat & Bryan K. Church & Richard Deaves, 2006. "Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(2), pages 419-436, October.
    19. Ernan Haruvy & Charles N. Noussair & Owen Powell, 2014. "The Impact of Asset Repurchases and Issues in an Experimental Market," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 18(2), pages 681-713.
    20. Olivier Brandouy & Angelo Corelli & Iryna Veryzhenko & Roger Waldeck, 2012. "A re-examination of the “zero is enough” hypothesis in the emergence of financial stylized facts," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 7(2), pages 223-248, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    market bubbles; intertemporal competitive equilibrium; experimental markets; trading agents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0306001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.