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American politics, the presidency of the World Bank, and development policy

Author

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  • Lavelle, Kathryn C.

Abstract

The World Bank's president has been an American by tradition. Yet little work has explored the consequences for this connection in influencing visions of development in the organization across time. This paper uses evidence from archives, congressional hearing records, and memoirs and histories of World Bank presidents to investigate United States-World Bank relations and development policy during four presidencies--Eugene Meyer, Eugene Black, Robert McNamara, and James Wolfensohn. The author argues that at times the political arrangements had the effect of pushing the Bank toward greater institutional independence from the United States, particularly when partisanship in American politics rose and new United States presidential administrations came into office with the World Bank president's term holding over from before. At other times, United States-World Bank connections pulled the Bank into foreign policy issues in the United States that the Bank might not otherwise have addressed when advocates pressed their case on Capitol Hill.

Suggested Citation

  • Lavelle, Kathryn C., 2013. "American politics, the presidency of the World Bank, and development policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6377, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6377
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lavelle,Kathryn C., 2013. "Money and Banks in the American Political System," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107028043, September.
    2. Babb, Sarah, 2009. "Behind the Development Banks," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226033648, December.
    3. Hart, David, 2002. "Business Is Not an Interest Group (and, by the Way, There's No Such Thing as "Business"): On the Study of Companies in American National Politics," Working Paper Series rwp02-032, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. Lavelle,Kathryn C., 2013. "Money and Banks in the American Political System," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107609167, September.
    5. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226033655 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks&Banking Reform; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Corporate Law; Access to Finance; Hazard Risk Management;
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