Net Borda rules with desirability
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), 2009. "The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-540-79128-7, June.
- Hansson, Bengt & Sahlquist, Henrik, 1976. "A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 193-200, October.
- Pavel Yu. Chebotarev & Elena Shamis, 1998. "Characterizations of scoring methodsfor preference aggregation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 80(0), pages 299-332, January.
- Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver, 2009. "Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Steven J. Brams & William V. Gehrlein & Fred S. Roberts (ed.), The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order, pages 215-237, Springer.
- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019.
"A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption,"
Working Papers
halshs-02440615, HAL.
- Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers 1938, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Florian Brandl & Dominik Peters, 2019. "An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(4), pages 685-707, April.
- Eric Kamwa, 2023.
"On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 169-205, July.
- Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-03614585, HAL.
- Alessandro Albano & José Luis García-Lapresta & Antonella Plaia & Mariangela Sciandra, 2023. "A family of distances for preference–approvals," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 323(1), pages 1-29, April.
- Maksim Gladyshev, 2019. "Vulnerability Of Voting Paradoxes As A Criteria For Voting Procedure Selection," HSE Working papers WP BRP 70/PS/2019, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2020. "Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 85-116, June.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2020. "Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections," Papers 2008.08451, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
- Haris Aziz & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 1-45, January.
- Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2021. "Axioms for defeat in democratic elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 475-524, October.
- António Osório, 2017. "Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 253(1), pages 501-518, June.
- Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2019. "Balancedness of social choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 59-67.
- Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Montinari, Natalia, 2014.
"Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 206-221.
- Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Natalia Montinari, 2012. "Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical and experimental analysis," Jena Economics Research Papers 2012-005, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- László Csató, 2019. "An impossibility theorem for paired comparisons," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 27(2), pages 497-514, June.
- Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 551-569, July.
- Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2023.
"A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 965-985, August.
- Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2023. "A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems," Post-Print hal-04114152, HAL.
- Núñez, Matías, 2015. "Threshold voting leads to Type-Revelation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 211-213.
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2015.
"The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 243-269, March.
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2014. "The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules," Post-Print hal-01450834, HAL.
- Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
- Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2011. "When does approval voting make the "right choices"?," MPRA Paper 34262, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021.
"An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 535-555, October.
- Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation," Post-Print hal-03347632, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
Net Borda rules; Desirability; The outside option; approval-cancellation; cyclic cancellation; aggregated cancellation;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wap:wpaper:2002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Haruko Noguchi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/spwasjp.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.