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Contestable Licensing

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Abstract

We analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing - a franchisee halds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another firm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not verifiable, the simple regulatory scheme we describe combines market-like incentives with regulatory oversight to generate efficient outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Zvika Neeman & Gerhard O. Orosel, 2000. "Contestable Licensing," Vienna Economics Papers vie0004, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0004
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    File URL: https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0004.pdf
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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