Inflation, Income Redistribution, and Optimal Central Bank Independence
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Cited by:
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana N., 2004.
"Independent monetary policies and social equity,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 103-110, October.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2003. "Independent Monetary Policies and Social Equality," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0307, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2001.
"The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0128, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 3223, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2006. "Heterogeneity In A Currency Union With Social Market Objectives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(1), pages 129-152, February.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2005.
"Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design,"
German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Hallett Andrew Hughes & Weymark Diana N., 2005. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0202, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002.
"Government Leadership and Central Bank Design,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0208, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Dec 2004.
- Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Government Leadership and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Beck, Günther W. & Beyer, Robert C. M. & Kontny, Markus & Wieland, Volker, 2015. "Monetary Cross-Checking in Practice," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113126, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0220, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Central bank independence; inflation bias;JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2001-11-21 (Central Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2004-12-12 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2004-12-12 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2001-11-21 (Monetary Economics)
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