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Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market

Author

Listed:
  • Reny, P.J.
  • Bhattacharya, U.
  • Reny, P.J.
  • Spiegel, M.

Abstract

An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties.
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Suggested Citation

  • Reny, P.J. & Bhattacharya, U. & Reny, P.J. & Spiegel, M., 1993. "Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 9318, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:9318
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. José M. Marín & Rohit Rahi, 2000. "Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 563-579.
    2. Sujoy Mukerji & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2001. "Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Financial Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(4), pages 883-904.
    3. Jinghan Cai & Chiu Yu Ko & Yuming Li & Le Xia, 2019. "Hide and Seek: Uninformed Traders and the Short-sales Constraints," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 20(1), pages 319-356, May.
    4. Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg, 2006. "Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown," Working papers 2006/09, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    5. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2010. "Contagious Adverse Selection - Revised November, 2010," Working Papers 1282, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    6. Paulo Pereira da Silva & Isabel Vieira, 2024. "Stock price informativeness and credit default swap trading," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(3), pages 2950-2970, July.
    7. Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg, 2008. "Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 97-125, May.
    8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2012. "Contagious Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 1-21, January.
    9. Itay Goldstein & Philip Bond, 2012. "Government intervention and information aggregation by prices," 2012 Meeting Papers 225, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Russ, David, 2022. "Multidimensional noise and non-fundamental information diversity," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    11. Muendler, Marc-Andreas, 2005. "The Action Value of Information and the Natural Transparency Limit¤," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6qb079x5, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    12. Kazuhiko Ohashi, 2003. "When Should a CAT Index Futures Be Created?," ISER Discussion Paper 0576, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Giovanni Cespa, 2005. "Giffen goods and market making," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(4), pages 983-997, June.
    14. Spiegel, Matthew, 2008. "Patterns in cross market liquidity," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 2-10, March.
    15. Rossen Valkanov & Andra Ghent, 2014. "Complexity in Structured Finance: Financial Wizardry or Smoke and Mirrors," 2014 Meeting Papers 104, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic theory ; securities;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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