IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/uwa/wpaper/12-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Costly Reporting, Ex-post Monitoring, and Commercial Piracy: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Ishita Chatterjee

    (Business School, University of Western Australia)

Abstract

This paper examines the regulatory authority’s decision, following a report from the legal firm, on monitoring commercial piracy in a market characterised by asymmetric product differentiation. I show that with ex-post monitoring the government will monitor piracy under both price and quantity competition if the legal firm’s political influence is sufficiently high. The study also finds that there exists a unique level of the relative cross-price impact of the pirate’s price on the legal firm’s output, above which monitoring will be higher under quantity competition, and below which monitoring will be higher under price competition. Moreover, I show that when the government can credibly commit to monitor piracy the legal firm’s investment on innovation is higher under quantity competition than under price competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Ishita Chatterjee, 2012. "Costly Reporting, Ex-post Monitoring, and Commercial Piracy: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 12-21, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uwa:wpaper:12-21
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.business.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/2191837/12-21-Costly-Reporting,-Ex-post-Monitoring-and-Commercial-Piracy,-A-Game-Theoretic-Analysis.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwa:wpaper:12-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sam Tang (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deuwaau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.