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Strategy-Proof Aggregation Rules in Median Join-Semilattices and Arrowian Social Welfare Functions

Author

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  • Ernesto Savaglio
  • Stefano Vannucci

Abstract

Three characterizations of the whole class of strategyproof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal total preorders in Önite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such class consists precisely of generalized weak consensus-sponsorship rules induced by certain families of order Ölters of the coalition poset. It follows that the co-majority rule and many other inclusive aggregation rules belong to that class. The co-majority rule for an odd number of agents is also characterized. The existence of strategy-proof anonymous neutral and unanimity-respecting social welfare functions which satisfy a suitably relaxed independence condition is shown to follow from our characterizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2020. "Strategy-Proof Aggregation Rules in Median Join-Semilattices and Arrowian Social Welfare Functions," Department of Economics University of Siena 834, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:834
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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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