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Das zukünftige Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Demokratie aus ökonomischer Sicht

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  • Kirchgaessner, Gebhard

Abstract

Whether democracy or capitalism should have normative priority depends on the philosophical point of view but also how both are defined. The more relevant perspective is, however, the positive one. Formally, politics dominate, but the economy often dominates de facto because political decisions against interests of powerful economic players might cause high societal costs. Since the downfall of the Iron Wall capitalism spread out much more than democracy. Future development might strongly depend on the development of the new authoritarian market economies: Can high growth continue while political rights are largely suppressed, or do they have to concede more and more to democratic rights in order to ensure further eco-nomic growth? One would like to see the latter one, but this is by no means sure.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirchgaessner, Gebhard, 2015. "Das zukünftige Verhältnis von Kapitalismus und Demokratie aus ökonomischer Sicht," Economics Working Paper Series 1506, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2015:06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capitalism; Democracy; Economic Development; Market Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

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