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Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union

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  • H.J. Roelfsema

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of legislative bargaining in the EU on public goodsprovision and lobbying. We argue that delegation to a single policy maker at thecentralized level -which we call supranational policy making- increases lobbyingexpenditures. When policy in the center is formulated by a committee consisting ofnational representatives -intergovernmental decision making- centralization causeslobbying expenditures fall, for centralization makes national policy makers moreresponsive to demands from domestic lobbies. In the extensions we consider theeffects of enlargement on lobbying and analyze endogenous lobby formation.

Suggested Citation

  • H.J. Roelfsema, 2004. "Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union," Working Papers 04-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0416
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    As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
    1. > Political Economy > The Political Economy of the European Union > Economic Policy and Policy-Making in the European Union

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    Cited by:

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    Keywords

    Centralization; Fiscal Federalism; Legislative Bargaining; Lobbying; the European Union;
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