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On the structural difference between the evolutionary approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Jorgen Jacobsen
  • Mogens Jensen
  • Brigitte Sloth

Abstract

We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Mogens Jensen & Brigitte Sloth, 1999. "On the structural difference between the evolutionary approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob," Economics Working Papers 477, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1999.
    • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:477
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    Cited by:

    1. Burkhard Hehenkamp, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 249-262.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary learning; coordination games; equilibrium selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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