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Spontaneous Privatization in the Soviet Union: How, Why and for Whom?

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  • Simon Johnson

Abstract

Many Soviet state enterprises are changing their legal form. Permissive but imprecise legislation, policy paralysis at all levels of government, the breakdown of the state supply system, and continued excess demand, have allowed managers of state firms to initiate "spontaneous privatization" -- through which managers and other individuals are effectively obtaining property rights which previously belonged to ministries, planners and the Communist Party.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Johnson, 1991. "Spontaneous Privatization in the Soviet Union: How, Why and for Whom?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-1991-091, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-1991-091
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    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/WP91.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    4. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    5. David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs, 1990. "Privitization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(2), pages 293-342.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniele Girardi & Roberto Veneziani & Susanne Wengle, 2023. "Great expectations: a tale of two transitions," Working Papers 968, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    2. Ardo H. Hansson, 1991. "The Importance of Being Earnest: Early Stages of the West German Wirtschaftswunder," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-1991-094, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Heinrich, Ralph P., 1993. "The merits of insider privatization: What Russia can learn from Eastern Central Europe," Kiel Discussion Papers 201, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Johnson, Simon & Islamov, Bakhtior, "undated". "Property Rights and Economic Reform in Uzbekistan," WIDER Working Papers 295626, United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Juha Honkkila, 1997. "Privatization, Asset Distribution and Equity in Transitional Economies," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-1997-125, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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