IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/unu/wpaper/dp2001-125.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Transaction Cost Politics, Institutions for Commitment and Rent Seeking

Author

Listed:
  • Mansoob Murshed

Abstract

In developing countries, particularly in those countries that have experienced declining growth rates, institutional failure (bad policies) is closely related to development failure and growth collapses. This paper addresses the issues of commitment, compromise and rent seeking, all of which are relevant to institutional design and the formulation of optimal policies. The models in the paper are within the genre of endogenous policy formation, transaction cost politics, and models of rent seeking.

Suggested Citation

  • Mansoob Murshed, 2001. "Transaction Cost Politics, Institutions for Commitment and Rent Seeking," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-125, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    • Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2001-125
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/dp2001-125.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. William Easterly & Ross Levine, 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1203-1250.
    3. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    4. Tony Addison & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 487-501, July.
    5. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    6. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
    7. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    8. Lane, Philip R & Tornell, Aaron, 1996. "Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-241, June.
    9. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    10. Azam, Jean-Paul, 1995. "How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 173-184, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2005. "The Role of Government in Anti-Social Redistributive Activities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1427, CESifo.
    2. Adnan Haider & Musleh ud Din & Ejaz Ghani, 2011. "Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and Bureaucratic Corruption on Inflation and Growth: The Case of Pakistan," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 50(4), pages 773-807.
    3. Chang, Chong-Chuo, 2023. "The impact of quality of institutions on firm performance: A global analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 694-716.
    4. repec:pdn:wpaper:79 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Holger Strulik, 2008. "Social composition, social conflict and economic development," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 1145-1170, July.
    6. Polimeni, John M. & Iorgulescu Polimeni, Raluca & Trees, W. Scott, 2007. "Extending The Augmented Solow Growth Model To Explain Transitional Economies," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 4(1), pages 65-76, March.
    7. Henri Atangana Ondoa, 2013. "Gouvernance et croissance économique en Afrique," African Development Review, African Development Bank, vol. 25(2), pages 130-147, June.
    8. Toke S. Aidt, 2011. "Corruption and Sustainable Development," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Kerekes, Carrie B. & Williamson, Claudia R., 2008. "Unveiling de Soto's mystery: property rights, capital formation, and development," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(3), pages 299-325, December.
    10. Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, 2018. "Causes And Effects Of Corruption: What Has Past Decade'S Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 335-356, April.
    11. Ines Lindner & Holger Strulik, 2008. "Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Appropriation Norms, and Economic Development," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(298), pages 244-258, May.
    12. Gradstein, Mark, 2003. "Governance and economic growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3098, The World Bank.
    13. Gradstein, Mark, 2004. "Governance and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 505-518, April.
    14. Maria Del Mar Salinas-Jimenez & Javier Salinas-Jimenez, 2006. "Corruption and Productivity Growth in OECD Countries," ERSA conference papers ersa06p99, European Regional Science Association.
    15. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    16. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
    17. Rogers, Mark Llewellyn, 2008. "Directly unproductive schooling: How country characteristics affect the impact of schooling on growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 356-385, February.
    18. Usman Khalid & Mohammad Amin, 2023. "The impact of ethnic fractionalisation on labor productivity: Does firm size matter?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(7), pages 2213-2249, October.
    19. John McArthur & Francis Teal, 2002. "Corruption and firm performance in Africa," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-10, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:dp2001-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Siméon Rapin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/widerfi.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.