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Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

Author

Listed:
  • Peleg, B.

    (Externe publicaties SBE)

  • Peters, H.J.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Storcken, A.J.A.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Peleg, B. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2003. "Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2003025
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2003025
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    Cited by:

    1. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2020. "Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    2. Saptarshi Mukherjee & Hans Peters, 2022. "Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 1009-1028, November.

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