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Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?

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Abstract

The Supreme Court has long held that campaign finance regulations are permissible for the purpose of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. Yet the implied hypothesis that campaign finance reforms are effective tools for combating public corruption has gone essentially untested. We conduct the first systematic evaluation of the effects of campaign finance laws on actual corruption rates in the states. We examine the effects of state reforms on both convictions and filings in public corruption cases over the last 25 years; overall, we find no strong or convincing evidence that state campaign finance reforms reduce public corruption. Earlier research that employs similar methods also finds little support for the contention that state campaign finance regulations increase public trust and confidence in government. Together, these results call into question the legal rationale for campaign finance regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Reduce Public Corruption?," Working Papers 1301, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    • Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:1301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, 2008. "Weathering Corruption," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(4), pages 667-681, November.
    2. James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, 2003. "The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(3), pages 341-365, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Milyo, 2013. "Campaign Spending and Electoral Competition: Towards More Policy Relevant Research," Working Papers 1311, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    2. Ramos, M., 2018. "Estimating the nature of political corruption: evidence from a policy experiment in Brazil," Research Department working papers 1391, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    3. Necmi K. Avkiran & Direnç K. Kanol & Barry Oliver & Tom Smith, 2016. "Knowledge of campaign finance regulation reduces perceptions of corruption," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 56(4), pages 961-984, December.
    4. Noel Campbell & Adriana S. Cordis, 2014. "Expected corruption and business formation," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 3(2), pages 292-305, October.
    5. John Maloney & Andrew Pickering, 2013. "Political Competition, Political Donations, Economic Policy and Growth," Discussion Papers 13/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Jeffrey Milyo & Adriana Cordis, 2013. "Measuring Public Corruption in the United States: Evidence from Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions," Working Papers 1322, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    7. John Maloney & Andrew Pickering, 2018. "The Economic Consequences of Political Donation Limits," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 479-517, July.
    8. Tilman Klumpp & Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, 2016. "The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, Independent Spending, and Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 1-43.
    9. Cordis, Adriana S. & Warren, Patrick L., 2014. "Sunshine as disinfectant: The effect of state Freedom of Information Act laws on public corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 18-36.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public corruption; campaign finance; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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