IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ulp/sbbeta/2021-50.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fiscal rules’ compliance and Social Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Kea BARET

Abstract

This paper studies the side-effects of fiscal rules’ compliance on social welfare. It considers national Budget Balance Rules’ (BBR) compliance effects on macroeconomic indicators and social welfare proxy indicators in OECD countries between 2004 and 2015. Instead of fiscal rules strength or fiscal rules presence effectiveness, we focus on fiscal rules’ compliance to assess the impact of fiscal rules’ performance on social welfare. The paper shows that governments seem to operate a reallocation of their spending to ensure both BBR’s compliance and economic objectives. Nevertheless, governments choices regarding their public spending composition seem leading to an increase in social inequalities suggesting that governments finally face a trade-off between fiscal rules’ compliance and social objectives. The analysis constitutes the first use of a causal Machine Mearning approach, namely the Double/Debiased Machine Learning recently developed by Chernozhukov et al. [2018], applied to fiscal rules’ performance assessment issues. This method allows us to highlight the key determinants of national BBR’s compliance as well as assessing the compliance’s effect on different macroeconomic and social indicators. We take care of voter preferences by computing a new proxy variable through Latent Factor Analysis approach and show that voter preferences appear as a key determinant for BBR’s compliance, giving an empirical proof that Wyplosz [2012]’s bias may matter when assessing fiscal rules’ performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Kea BARET, 2021. "Fiscal rules’ compliance and Social Welfare," Working Papers of BETA 2021-50, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2021-50
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2021/2021-50.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Kea Baret & Alexandru Minea, 2021. "National fiscal rules and fiscal discipline in the European Union," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(20), pages 2337-2359, April.
    2. Aiyagari, S. Rao & McGrattan, Ellen R., 1998. "The optimum quantity of debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 447-469, October.
    3. Burbidge, John B, 1983. "Government Debt in an Overlapping-Generations Model with Bequests and Gifts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 222-227, March.
    4. Alexandre Belloni & Victor Chernozhukov & Denis Chetverikov & Christian Hansen & Kengo Kato, 2018. "High-dimensional econometrics and regularized GMM," CeMMAP working papers CWP35/18, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    5. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Fang, Xiangming & Kim, Young & Lledó, Victor & Mbaye, Samba & Zhang, Xiaoxiao, 2019. "Independent fiscal councils: Recent trends and performance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 53-69.
    6. Kéa Baret & Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Théophilos Papadimitriou, 2021. "Forecasting the Stability and Growth Pact compliance using Machine Learning," Working Papers of BETA 2021-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    7. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    8. Antonio Afonso & Ludger Schuknecht & Vito Tanzi, 2010. "Public sector efficiency: evidence for new EU member states and emerging markets," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(17), pages 2147-2164.
    9. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December.
    10. António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles & Ana Venâncio, 2021. "Taxation and Public Spending Efficiency: An International Comparison," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(3), pages 356-383, September.
    11. Susan Athey & Julie Tibshirani & Stefan Wager, 2016. "Generalized Random Forests," Papers 1610.01271, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2018.
    12. Buhlmann P. & Yu B., 2003. "Boosting With the L2 Loss: Regression and Classification," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 98, pages 324-339, January.
    13. Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, "undated". "Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States (Reprint 060)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 10-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    14. Susan Athey, 2018. "The Impact of Machine Learning on Economics," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, pages 507-547, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03121966 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Bergman, U. Michael & Hutchison, Michael M. & Jensen, Svend E. Hougaard, 2016. "Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-19.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kea BARET, 2021. "Fiscal rules’ compliance and Social Welfare," Working Papers of BETA 2021-38, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    2. López-Herrera, Carmen & Cordero, José M. & Pedraja-Chaparro, Francisco & Polo, Cristina, 2023. "Fiscal rules and their influence on public sector efficiency," MPRA Paper 119018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. António Afonso & José Alves, 2023. "Are fiscal consolidation episodes helpful for public sector efficiency?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(31), pages 3547-3560, July.
    4. Kéa Baret & Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Théophilos Papadimitriou, 2021. "Forecasting the Stability and Growth Pact compliance using Machine Learning," Working Papers of BETA 2021-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    5. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03121966 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Kea Baret & Alexandru Minea, 2021. "National fiscal rules and fiscal discipline in the European Union," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(20), pages 2337-2359, April.
    7. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
    8. Hansen, Daniel, 2020. "The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Cezara Vinturis, 2023. "How do fiscal rules shape governments' spending behavior?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 322-341, April.
    10. Kea BARET & Theophilos PAPADIMITRIOU, 2019. "On the Stability and Growth Pact compliance: what is predictable with machine learning?," Working Papers of BETA 2019-48, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    11. Borge, Lars-Erik & Hopland, Arnt O., 2020. "Less fiscal oversight, more adjustment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    12. Căpraru, Bogdan & Georgescu, George & Sprincean, Nicu, 2022. "Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(2).
    13. Mitsi Dimitra, 2021. "Does the Quality of Fiscal Institutions Matter for Fiscal Performance? A Panel Data Analysis of European Countries," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(1), pages 1-33, January.
    14. António Afonso & José Alves, 2022. "Does government spending efficiency improve fiscal sustainability?," Working Papers REM 2022/0226, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    15. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," Working Papers 189, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    16. Borge, Lars-Erik, 2005. "Strong politicians, small deficits: evidence from Norwegian local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 325-344, June.
    17. Lekniūtė, Zina & Beetsma, Roel & Ponds, Eduard, 2019. "U.S. municipal yields and unfunded state pension liabilities," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 15-32.
    18. Bachtrögler, Julia & Badinger, Harald & Fichet de Clairfontaine, Aurélien & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2014. "Summarizing Data using Partially Ordered Set Theory: An Application to Fiscal Frameworks in 97 Countries," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 181, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    19. Michael C Knaus & Michael Lechner & Anthony Strittmatter, 2021. "Machine learning estimation of heterogeneous causal effects: Empirical Monte Carlo evidence," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 24(1), pages 134-161.
    20. Maltritz, Dominik & Wüste, Sebastian, 2015. "Determinants of budget deficits in Europe: The role and relations of fiscal rules, fiscal councils, creative accounting and the Euro," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 222-236.
    21. Fabio Canova & Evi Pappa, 2006. "Does It Cost to Be Virtuous? The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2004, pages 327-370, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal rules’ compliance; Social Welfare; Fiscal Surveillance; Machine learning.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2021-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bestrfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.