IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ulb/ulbeco/2013-226867.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incitations perverses, résultats non durables. Le rôle des politiques salariales et fiscales dans la crise financière

Author

Listed:
  • Etienne De Callataÿ
  • Roland Gillet

Abstract

The credit crisis of 2007-2009 can be partly explained by the perverse incentives provided by both income and tax policies. Income policies have been designed to address the principal-agent problem but have ended up giving a strong incentive to maximize short term profits. Combined with asymetric pay-off structures, it led to risk-lover behaviors that turned to be detrimental to the organizations and their stakeholders. Tax policies have promoted indebtness through the tax deductibility of interest charges for coroporations and of mortgage for households. Differences in tax treatment have also led to the substitution of more lightly taxed stock options and capital gains to regular remunerations. A side effect of this arbitrage has been to reinforce risk-taking behaviors.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne De Callataÿ & Roland Gillet, 2010. "Incitations perverses, résultats non durables. Le rôle des politiques salariales et fiscales dans la crise financière," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/226867, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/226867
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/226867. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsulbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.