Essays on innovation and investment decisions under imperfect competition

Innovation incentives are imperfectly provided in market settings: When deciding on their innovation activity, firms tend to focus on the maximization of their private benefits, poorly internalizing social benefits. This thesis analyzes how policy intervention could be designed in order to align private and social incentives. In the three papers of this thesis, I will consider three environments where firms' choices in a laissez-faire situation may be socially inefficient. The inefficiencies arise because of learning externalities, free riding when the innovation decision is made by a group of participants, or because firms are not willing to invest in a new activity that has a higher social than private value. In the first thesis paper, I deal with the strategies of firms in innovative consumer product markets characterized by demand uncertainty. I analyze the timing and location decision of firms in that context. In the second thesis paper, I consider the investment incentives of financial market infrastructures (FMIs). FMIs comprise the set of institutions that allow financial market participants to engage with each other. I assess the innovation incentives for different forms of ownership (user-owned versus third-party owned) and identify infrastructure service provision equilibria. In the third thesis paper, I address the question of how a government should allocate a subsidy budget over time in order to maximize the innovation activity in an industry.