IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ulb/ulbeco/2013-164290.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Trade unions and firms' product market power

Author

Listed:
  • Jacques Bughin

Abstract

A production function model with efficient bargaining between oligopolistic firms and unions is developed to distinguish between product market power and union power in capturing economic rents. The model is formalised using the generalized Nash bargaining solution, and is empirically tested on four Belgian manufacturing sectors. The conclusions are that product market power is significantly eroded by wage rents, but firms retain most of their power during negotiations. Also, the restrictions imposed on the data do not reject the hypothesis that wage erosion arises from efficient bargaining, in accordance with other empirical findings for Belgian manufacturing.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacques Bughin, 1996. "Trade unions and firms' product market power," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/164290, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/164290
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/164290. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsulbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.