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Hear no Evil, See no Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes may be Ineffective at Preventing Cartels

Author

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  • Andreas Stephan

    (Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

Cartel practices attract enormous corporate fines, even where they only involve a handful of employees. Internal compliance programmes are thought to protect firms by training employees and auditing their activities. However, this paper argues that such programmes are ineffective because cartelists typically know what they are doing is illegal, go to great lengths to avoid detection and are usually senior managers. Moreover, compliance programmes do not mitigate cartel fines, despite their being imposed on the whole corporation years after an infringement has occurred. It is argued that the threat of criminal sanctions against individuals is essential to effective internal compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Stephan, 2009. "Hear no Evil, See no Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes may be Ineffective at Preventing Cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2009-09, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2009_09
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    Cited by:

    1. Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E. & Sorgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 4/2013, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition Law; Antitrust Compliance; Cartels; Article 81;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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