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Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Zhijun Chen

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia and School of Economics, Zhejiang University)

Abstract

Fighting collusion has long been a challenge in organizaions, whilst favoritism in organizations has long been attacked as one of the most important sources of workplace conflicts. This paper links the phenomena of collusion and favoritism together which seem to be irrelevant. We show that favoritism cannot benefit organizations where collusion is not a serious concern, meanwhile explicit favoritism can bring conflicts among collusive subordinates and undermine the efficiency of collusion, therefore it is effective in fighting collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhijun Chen, 2008. "Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2008-27, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    • Handle: RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2008_27
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    Keywords

    Collusion; Favoritism; Tournaments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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