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The Asymmetric Regulation applied on Asset Evaluation for Network Utilities’ tenders: the italian liberalisation of gas distribution’ case

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  • Roberto Fazioli
  • Donato Lenza

Abstract

Since June 2011, the individual municipalities cannot independently process their public tenders for the award of the natural gas provision services. Such public tenders pertain to pre-defined areas (known as Ambito Territoriale Minimo – ATEM, in short), much larger than most municipalities. This paper discusses the negative effects of the regulation defining the ATEM (i.e. specially Asymmetric Regulation) as the unit of reference for the public tenders, highlighting, in particular, the issues and the damages caused to the municipalities. It then suggests a way forward (i) to address the financial issues that the regulation is causing to the municipalities and (ii) to overcome the current standstill which is profitable only for the incumbents currently managing the distribution network despite the expiration of their contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Fazioli & Donato Lenza, 2019. "The Asymmetric Regulation applied on Asset Evaluation for Network Utilities’ tenders: the italian liberalisation of gas distribution’ case," Working Papers 2019028, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udf:wpaper:2019028
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    Keywords

    Network Utilities Competition; Asymmetric Regulation; Asset evaluation; Access Prices Regulation; Network Charges; Contestability; Public Finance Effect;
    All these keywords.

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