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On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games

Author

Listed:
  • Elvio Accinelli

    (Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de san Luis Potosí. Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

  • Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera

    (Department of Economics at the University of Siena.)

Abstract

We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy ESS for asymmetric two-population games of finite size in its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a defnition of ESS for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. Then, we show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (NE) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) NE of the symmetric version game. So, we study (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and define corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvio Accinelli & Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera, 2010. "On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1010, Department of Economics - dECON.
    • Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:1010
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/2162
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    Cited by:

    1. Calvin Cochran & Cailin O’Connor, 2019. "Inequality and inequity in the emergence of conventions," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 18(3), pages 264-281, August.
    2. Tiziano Distefano & Simone D'Alessandro, 2017. "An Evolutionary approach to International Environmental Agreements," SEEDS Working Papers 0517, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Sep 2017.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric game; Evolutionary games; ESS; Replicator dynamics.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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