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La conquista de la inflación en Chile

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  • Felipe Morandé
  • Carlos Noton

Abstract

Luego de décadas de ardua lucha, Chile ha derrotado recientemente a la inflación y conseguido la tan esquiva estabilidad de precios. Este trabajo aborda algunos aspectos históricos que enmarcan un camino estuvo plagado de variados programas de estabilización y verifica la validez empírica de un conjunto de hipótesis que caracterizan lo que ha sido la relación entre la inflación y las políticas diseñadas para contenerla. Entre otros resultados, se encuentra que la inflación hasta 1974 tuvo una clara raíz fiscal pero que la solución de la causa fiscal de la inflación demostró ser una condición necesaria pero no suficiente para contener definitivamente la inflación. En efecto, después que en 1976 desaparecieron los déficit fiscales financiados con emisión monetaria, tuvieron que pasar casi veinte años para que la inflación bajara consistentemente a cifras de un dígito y tres años más antes que alcanzara tasas similares a las de países desarrollados. La evidencia mostrada en este trabajo muestra que la renuencia de diferentes autoridades a reducir más drásticamente la inflación estuvo influida por la sustancial inercia del proceso inflacionario, a su vez vinculada a la amplia indización de diversos precios y a la desconfianza del mercado frente a la verdadera voluntad anti inflacionaria de quienes tenían a su cargo las políticas macro. Sólo la inauguración de un banco central autónomo en 1989 y la posterior implementación rigurosa y metódica de un esquema de metas de inflación pudieron cambiar lo que hasta entonces era un indefectible proceso de regresión a su media histórica de la tasa de inflación. En este trabajo se muestra la importancia empírica de estos hechos, los que confirman a su vez que, previo a 1990, la principal falencia de la lucha contra la inflación, una vez superado el problema fiscal, era la ausencia de un ancla nominal correcta.

Suggested Citation

  • Felipe Morandé & Carlos Noton, 2004. "La conquista de la inflación en Chile," Working Papers wp209, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Rosende & Matías Tapia, 2015. "Monetary Policy in Chile: Institutions, Objectives,and Instruments," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Ricardo J. Caballero & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (ed.),Economic Policies in Emerging-Market Economies Festschrift in Honor of Vittorio Corbo, edition 1, volume 21, chapter 12, pages 263-307, Central Bank of Chile.

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