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Dynamic Income Taxation without Commitment: Comparing Alternative Tax Systems

Author

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  • Jang-Ting Guo

    (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside)

  • Alan Krause

    (Department of Economics, University of York)

Abstract

This paper addresses the question as to whether it is optimal to use separating or pooling nonlinear income taxation, or to use linear income taxation, when the government cannot commit to its future tax policy. We consider both two- period and inÖnite-horizon settings. Under empirically plausible parameter values, separating income taxation is optimal in the two-period model, whereas linear income taxation is optimal when the time horizon is inÖnite. The welfare e§ects of varying the discount rate, the degree of wage inequality, and the population of high-skill workers are also explored. For realistic changes in these parameters, separating income taxation remains optimal in the two-period formulation, and linear income taxation remains optimal in the inÖnite-horizon model.

Suggested Citation

  • Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2010. "Dynamic Income Taxation without Commitment: Comparing Alternative Tax Systems," Working Papers 201005, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucr:wpaper:201005
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    2. Marcus Berliant & John O. Ledyard, 2014. "Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(2), pages 196-221, April.
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    9. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2019. "Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
    10. Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015. "Dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no commitment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 101-119.
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    14. Jang‐Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2011. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(3), pages 463-480, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2018. "Changing social preferences and optimal redistributive taxation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 73-92.
    2. Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015. "Dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no commitment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 101-119.
    3. Marcus Berliant & John O. Ledyard, 2014. "Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(2), pages 196-221, April.
    4. Alan Krause, 2017. "On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 845-856, April.
    5. Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2014. "Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation Under Loose Commitment," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 1403-1427, September.
    6. Chen, Yunmin & Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2020. "The credibility of commitment and optimal nonlinear savings taxation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    7. Shigeo Morita, 2022. "The MCPF under the pandemic," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(5), pages 993-1015, October.
    8. Shigeo Morita & Takuya Obara, 2021. "Public investment criteria under optimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 732-745, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic Income Taxation; Commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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