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Taxe environnementale et délégation

Author

Listed:
  • Kadohognon Sylvain Ouattara

    (ESCA Ecole de Management, Casablanca, et CREM-UMR CNRS 6211)

Abstract

Ce papier analyse la taxation des émissions de pollution dans une industrie où une entreprise semi-publique est en concurrence avec une entreprise privée (nationale ou étrangère). Nous supposons que les propriétaires des firmes engagent un gestionnaire à qui ils délèguent les décisions de production et d'abattement de la pollution. Nous montrons que la délégation a pour effet d'augmenter la taxe environnementale et le dommage environnemental. De plus, le niveau de taxe environnementale taxé par l'Etat en présence d'une firme privée étrangère est supérieur à celui taxé en présence d'une firme privée domestique.

Suggested Citation

  • Kadohognon Sylvain Ouattara, 2016. "Taxe environnementale et délégation," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 2016-10, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:2016-10
    as

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    File URL: https://ged.univ-rennes1.fr/nuxeo/site/esupversions/03407993-4716-4dcb-a5ad-de963a05e35e
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tohru Naito & Hikaru Ogawa, 2009. "Direct versus indirect environmental regulation in a partially privatized mixed duopoly," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(2), pages 87-100, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    duopole mixte; taxe environnementale; incitations managériales; privatisation partielle;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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