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Should I stay or should I go? Migrating away from an incumbent platform

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  • Crémer, Jacques
  • Biglaiser, Gary
  • Veiga, André

Abstract

We study incumbency advantage in markets with positive consumption externalities. Users of an incumbent platform receive sto- chastic opportunities to migrate to an entrant and can either accept them or wait for a future opportunity. In some circumstances, users have incentives to delay migration until others have migrated. If they all do so, no migration takes place, even when migration would have been Pareto-superior. We use our framework to identify environments where incumbency advantage is larger. A key result is that having more migration opportunities actually increases incumbency advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Crémer, Jacques & Biglaiser, Gary & Veiga, André, 2022. "Should I stay or should I go? Migrating away from an incumbent platform," TSE Working Papers 21-1281, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:126336
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Platform; Migration; Standardization and Compatibility; Industry Dynamics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure

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