IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tor/tecipa/dpuga-02-01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Knowledge creation and control in organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Diego Puga
  • Daniel Trefler

Abstract

The incremental innovations that underly much of modern economic growth typically involve changes to one or more components of a complex product. This creates a tension. On the one hand, a principal would like an agent to contribute innovative components. On the other hand, ironing out incompatibilities between interdependent components can be a drain on the principal's energies. The principal can conserve her energies by tightly controlling the innovation process, but this may inadvertently stifle the agent's incentive to innovate. We show precisely how this tension betweencreating knowledge and controlling knowledge shapes organizational forms.The novel concepts introduced are illustrated with case studies of the flatpanel cathode ray tube industry and Boeing's recent location decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Diego Puga & Daniel Trefler, 2002. "Knowledge creation and control in organizations," Working Papers dpuga-02-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:dpuga-02-01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/know.pdf
    File Function: Main Text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John McLaren, 2000. ""Globalization" and Vertical Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1239-1254, December.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    4. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2008. "Competing for Ownership," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(6), pages 1279-1308, December.
    6. Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, 2001. "Nursery Cities: Urban Diversity, Process Innovation, and the Life Cycle of Products," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1454-1477, December.
    7. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1994. "Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1085-1124.
    8. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
    9. Dalia Marin & Thierry Verdier, 2008. "Power Inside The Firm and The Market: A General Equilibrium Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 752-788, June.
    10. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 2002. "Innovation and Input Sharing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 25-45, January.
    12. Helper, Susan & MacDuffie, John Paul & Sabel, Charles, 2000. "Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 9(3), pages 443-487, September.
    13. K. J. Arrow, 1971. "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: F. H. Hahn (ed.), Readings in the Theory of Growth, chapter 11, pages 131-149, Palgrave Macmillan.
    14. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Power Inside the Firm and the Market," Discussion Papers in Economics 10, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    15. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    16. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 85-120.
    17. Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1987. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(3, Specia), pages 783-832.
    18. Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1988. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 862, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    19. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2003. "Outsourcing Versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 317-327, 04/05.
    2. Barbara J. Spencer, 2005. "International outsourcing and incomplete contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(4), pages 1107-1135, November.
    3. Pol Antràs & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2009. "Organizations and Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 43-64, May.
    4. Pol Antras & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "Global Sourcing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(3), pages 552-580, June.
    5. Fabrice Defever, 2011. "Incomplete Contracts and the Impact of Globalization on Consumer Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 3484, CESifo.
    6. Dalia Marin & Thierry Verdier, 2008. "Power Inside The Firm and The Market: A General Equilibrium Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(4), pages 752-788, June.
    7. Robert C. Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, 2005. "Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(2), pages 729-761.
    8. Zoltan Bakonyi & Balazs Murakozy, 2016. "Centralization of strategic decisions during the Great Recession: An empirical analysis of European manufacturing firms," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1617, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    9. Marin, Dalia & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Power Inside the Firm and the Market," Discussion Papers in Economics 10, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    10. Diego Puga & Daniel Trefler, 2005. "Wake up and smell the ginseng: The rise of incremental innovation in low-wage countries," Working Papers tecipa-193, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    11. Petroulas, Pavlos, 2007. "The effect of the euro on foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 1468-1491, August.
    12. Valeria Gattai, 2006. "From the Theory of the Firm to FDI and Internalisation: A Survey," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 65(2), pages 225-262, November.
    13. Carlos e Silva & Geoffrey Hewings, 2012. "Locational and managerial decisions as interdependent choices in the headquarter-manufacturing plant relationship: a theoretical approach," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 48(3), pages 703-717, June.
    14. Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 589-630, September.
    15. Robert C. Feenstra & Barbara J. Spencer, 2005. "Contractual Versus Generic Outsourcing: The Role of Proximity," NBER Working Papers 11885, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Puga, Diego & Trefler, Daniel, 2010. "Wake up and smell the ginseng: International trade and the rise of incremental innovation in low-wage countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 64-76, January.
    17. Li, Ben & Lu, Yi, 2009. "Geographic concentration and vertical disintegration: Evidence from China," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 294-304, May.
    18. Du, Julan & Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang, 2009. "Bi-sourcing in the global economy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 215-222, April.
    19. Joseph Pelzman, 2013. "“Womb for Rent”: International Service Trade Employing Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ARTs)," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 387-400, August.
    20. Motta, Massimo & Rønde, Thomas, 2002. "Trade Secret Laws, Labour Mobility and Innovations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3615, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Task assignment, incentives and technological factors," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 43-55.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    2. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    3. Bas, Maria & Carluccio, Juan, 2009. "Wage bargaining and the boundaries of the multinational firm," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28700, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Diego Puga & Daniel Trefler, 2005. "Wake up and smell the ginseng: The rise of incremental innovation in low-wage countries," Working Papers tecipa-193, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    5. Conconi, Paola & Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew F., 2012. "Trade liberalization and organizational change," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 197-208.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Rachel Griffith & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2010. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 989-1033, September.
    7. Barbara Spencer, 2005. "International outsourcing and incomplete contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(4), pages 1107-1135, November.
    8. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1876, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    9. Dessi, Roberta, 2009. "Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital," TSE Working Papers 09-075, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Erkal, Nisvan, 2007. "Buyer-supplier interaction, asset specificity, and product choice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 988-1010, October.
    11. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2001. "Integration vs. Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series 460, CESifo.
    12. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
    13. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Zingales, Luigi (ed.), 2016. "The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199826216.
    14. Makoto Hanazono, 2004. "Holdup with Subsidized Investment," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 640, Econometric Society.
    15. Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2000. "Interference, Contracts and Authority with Insecure Communication," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0650, Econometric Society.
    16. Laura Alfaro & Nick Bloom & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Patrick Legros & Andrew F Newman & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2024. "Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 34-72.
    17. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2004. "Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 3-30, March.
    18. Maskin, Eric, 2002. "On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 725-733, May.
    19. Bester, Helmut, 2002. "Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 3276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    incremental innovation; incomplete contracts; imperfect substitutability; appropriability; control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:dpuga-02-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: RePEc Maintainer (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.