On competing rewards standards : An experimental study of ultimatum bargaining
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Other versions of this item:
- Gneezy, Uri & Guth, Werner, 2003. "On competing rewards standards--an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 599-607.
- Gneezy, U. & Güth, W., 1997. "On Competing Rewards Standards -An Experimental Study of Ultimatum Bargaining-," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,98, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Gneezy, U. & Güth, W., 1998. "On competing rewards standards : An experimental study of ultimatum bargaining," Discussion Paper 1998-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Cited by:
- Neo, Wei Siong & Yu, Michael & Weber, Roberto A. & Gonzalez, Cleotilde, 2013. "The effects of time delay in reciprocity games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 20-35.
- Andrea Gallice, 2006.
"Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret,"
Working Papers
2006.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Gallice, Andrea, 2006. "Predicting one Shot Play in 2x2 Games Using Beliefs Based on Minimax Regret," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 12182, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Krawczyk, Michal & Le Lec, Fabrice, 2015.
"Can we neutralize social preference in experimental games?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 340-355.
- Michal Krawczyk & Fabrice Le Lec, 2015. "Can we neutralize social preference in experimental games?," Post-Print hal-01297361, HAL.
- Michal Krawczyk & Fabrice Le Lec, 2015. "Can we neutralize social preference in experimental games?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01297361, HAL.
- Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin, 2016.
"A Theory of Experiments: Invariance of Equilibrium to the Strategy Method of Elicitation and Implications for Social Preferences,"
TSE Working Papers
16-724, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Feb 2020.
- Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin, 2016. "A Theory of Experiments: Invariance of Equilibrium to the Strategy Method of Elicitation and Implications for Social Preferences," IAST Working Papers 16-54, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Feb 2020.
- Pfaff, Alexander & Vélez, Maria Alejandra, 2012. "Efficiency and equity in negotiated resource transfers: Contributions and limitations of trust with limited contracts," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 55-63.
- Fischer, Christian & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2019.
"Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly—An experiment,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 360-379.
- Fischer, Christian & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2018. "Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly: An experiment," DICE Discussion Papers 283, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), revised 2018.
- Güth, W. & Kroger, S. & Maug, E., 2003. "You May Have to Do it Again, Rocky! An Experimental Analysis of Bargaining with Risky Joint Profits," Discussion Paper 2003-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gallice, Andrea, 2007. "Best Responding to What? A Behavioral Approach to One Shot Play in 2x2 Games," Discussion Papers in Economics 1365, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Güth, W. & Kroger, S. & Maug, E., 2003. "You May Have to Do it Again, Rocky! An Experimental Analysis of Bargaining with Risky Joint Profits," Other publications TiSEM 22e50aad-c729-498d-9760-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
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