Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1978. "Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 943-952, October.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997.
"Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998.
"Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December.
- Ben Hermalin, 1996. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," Working Papers _006, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin, 1997. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," Microeconomics 9612002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
- Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
- Henry Mintzberg, 1971. "Managerial Work: Analysis from Observation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 97-110, October.
- Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Nicholas Bloom & Luis Garicano & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2014.
"The Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2859-2885, December.
- Nicholas Bloom & Luis Garicano & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2009. "The distinct effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on firm organization," NBER Working Papers 14975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nick Bloom & Luis Garicano & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2009. "The Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization," CEP Discussion Papers dp0927, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Van Reenen, John & Bloom, Nicholas & Garicano, Luis & Sadun, Raffaella, 2013. "The distinct effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on firm organization," CEPR Discussion Papers 9762, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bloom, Nick & Garicano, Luis & Sadun, Raffaella & Van Reenen, John, 2009. "The distinct effects of information technology and communication technology on firm organization," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25477, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jérôme Mathis & Marcello Puca & Simone M. Sepe, 2021. "Deliberative Institutions and Optimality," CSEF Working Papers 614, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jun 2021.
- Belloc, Filippo & Burdin, Gabriel & Landini, Fabio, 2020. "Corporate Hierarchies under Employee Representation," IZA Discussion Papers 13717, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jan Grobovšek, 2020.
"Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(5), pages 2256-2289.
- Jan Grobovsek, 2016. "Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 271, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Katayama, Hajime & Meagher, Kieron J. & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Authority and communication in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 315-348.
- Filippo Belloc & Gabriel Burdin & Fabio Landini, 2020. "Corporate Hierarchies and Labor Institutions," Department of Economics University of Siena 827, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007.
"Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1759-1799.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Aghion, Philippe & Lelarge, Claire & Van Reenen, John & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2006. "Technology, information and the decentralization of the firm," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 778, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm," CEP Discussion Papers dp0722, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- D, Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizzio Zilibotti, 2006. "Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm," Working Papers 2006-12, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Van Reenen, John & Lelarge, Claire & Aghion, Philippe & Acemoglu, Daron, 2007. "Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 4481506, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Van Reenen, John & Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Lelarge, Claire, 2006. "Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 5678, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D. Acemoglu & P. Aghion & C. Lelarge & J. van Reenen & F. Zilibotti, 2007. "Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm," Post-Print hal-04196815, HAL.
- Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 12206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2023.
"Citizen preferences and the architecture of government,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 537-585, October.
- Marie-Laure Breuillé & Jean-Marc Bourgeon, 2016. "Citizen preferences and the architecture of government," Post-Print hal-02949322, HAL.
- Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2023. "Citizen preferences and the architecture of government [Les préférences des citoyens et l'architecture du gouvernement]," Post-Print hal-04107151, HAL.
- Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2021. "Citizen preferences and the architecture of government," Working Papers hal-01869133, HAL.
- Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2018. "Citizen Preferences and the Architecture of Government," CESifo Working Paper Series 7245, CESifo.
- Caleb A. Cox & Brock Stoddard, 2021.
"Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 343-369, May.
- Caleb A. Cox & Brock Stoddard, 2018. "Common-Value Public Goods and Informational Social Dilemmas," Working Papers 18-04, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Garicano, Luis & Hubbard, Thomas N, 2007. "Managerial Leverage Is Limited by the Extent of the Market: Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Lawyers' Human Capital," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 1-43, February.
- Bruno Cassiman & Masako Ueda, 2006.
"Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-ups,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(2), pages 262-275, February.
- Cassiman, Bruno & Ueda, Masako, 2002. "Optimal Project Rejection and New Firm Start-Ups," CEPR Discussion Papers 3429, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cassiman , Bruno & Ueda, Masako, 2002. "Optimal project rejection and new firm start-ups," IESE Research Papers D/460, IESE Business School.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2006.
"The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 759-773, November.
- Raghuram Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2003. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies," NBER Working Papers 9633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Feltovich, Nick & Grossman, Philip J., 2015. "How does the effect of pre-play suggestions vary with group size? Experimental evidence from a threshold public-good game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 263-280.
- Paola Rovelli & Vincenzo Butticè, 2020. "On the organizational design of entrepreneurial ventures: the configurations of the entrepreneurial team," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 47(2), pages 243-269, June.
- Luis Garicano & Richard A. Posner, 2005.
"Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 151-170, Fall.
- Garicano, Luis & Posner, Richard A., 2005. "Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 5186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- David C. Chan, 2018. "The Efficiency of Slacking off: Evidence From the Emergency Department," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(3), pages 997-1030, May.
- Elisa Gerten & Michael Beckmann & Elisa Gerten & Matthias Kräkel, 2022.
"Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design,"
ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series
189, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Gerten, Elisa & Beckmann, Michael & Kräkel, Matthias, 2022. "Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design," IZA Discussion Papers 15491, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000.
""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
- Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 12534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ricardo Alonso & Niko Matouschek, 2008.
"Optimal Delegation,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(1), pages 259-293.
- Matouschek, Niko & Alonso, Ricardo, 2005. "Optimal Delegation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5289, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2008. "Optimal delegation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58665, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Hutzschenreuter, Thomas & Horstkotte, Julian, 2013. "Performance effects of international expansion processes: The moderating role of top management team experiences," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 259-277.
More about this item
Keywords
Communication; incentives; signalling; overconfidence; delegation; collaboration;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2004-05-26 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MIC-2015-04-25 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040042. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.