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An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions

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  • Nicholas Bardsley

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Peter G. Moffatt

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

Contributions to public goods simulated in economists' laboratoryexperiments have two peculiarities from the perspective ofstatistical modelling. There is a variety of contributor behaviours(Ledyard, 1995), suggestive perhaps of separate classes ofindividuals, and contributions are doubly censored. We present aneconometric model of contributions in sequential play, which takesinto account the censoring, admits variation both within and betweenindividuals, and allows for the existence of a distinct class offree-riders. The model synthesises the 2-limit tobit analysis ofNelson (1976), the extension of tobit to panel techniques by Kim andMaddala (1992) and the "p-tobit" hurdle model of Deaton and Irish(1984). We estimate it for panel data from a public good experimentreported in Bardsley (2000). It reveals pronounced inter- and intra-individual variation, and shows significant effects for subjects'order in a sequential game, others' contributions and the position ofthe choice task within the experiment. These effects are plausiblyattributable to egoism, reciprocity and learning respectively. Inaddition, the existence of a distinct class of free-riders, whoconform to a game theoretic prediction of unconditional non-contribution, is confirmed. The model is estimated for tasks inwhich "others' behaviour" was controlled by the experimenter (butwithout using deception). We compare its predictions for actual play(in which others' behaviour is not controlled) with behaviour in areal game task. The predictions are consistent with the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas Bardsley & Peter G. Moffatt, 2000. "An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-111/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000111
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Davis, Douglas D. & Holt, Charles a., 1993. "Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 8(2), pages 179-212.
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    3. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2000. "Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(3), pages 227-238, March.
    4. Kim, Byeong Soo & Maddala, G S, 1992. "Estimation and Specification Analysis of Models of Dividend Behavior Based on Censored Panel Data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 111-124.
    5. Offerman, Theo & Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur, 1996. "Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(437), pages 817-845, July.
    6. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
    7. Weimann, Joachim, 1994. "Individual behaviour in a free riding experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 185-200, June.
    8. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(3), pages 215-240, December.
    9. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control without Deception," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-107/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. Romaniuc Rustam, 2016. "What Makes Law to Change Behavior? An Experimental Study," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 447-475, July.

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