IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/sur/seedps/98.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulatory Reform of the Gas Market – The Case of the Storage Auction

Author

Listed:
  • David Hawdon

    (Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), University of Surrey)

  • Nicola Stevens

    (Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), Department of Economics, University of Surrey)

Abstract

The UK gas industry has undergone major changes since it was privatised in 1986 as a fully integrated monopoly. The most significant of these have occurred not as an outworking of the privatisation legislation but by the intervention of the ordinary competition authorities in support of an active industry regulator. While price capping continues to be used as the primary instrument for welfare protection against the still substantial monopolistic powers of the incumbent, new competition which has been positively encouraged, has had the greater impact on prices and choice. Recently, however, the regulator has encouraged the use of auctions for the sale of storage capacity. This paper considers the merits of auctions and makes a tentative evaluation of their effectiveness. Further use of auctions is recommended but reserve prices are considered inappropriate where monopoly power still remains.

Suggested Citation

  • David Hawdon & Nicola Stevens, 1999. "Regulatory Reform of the Gas Market – The Case of the Storage Auction," Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics Discussion Papers (SEEDS) 98, Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  • Handle: RePEc:sur:seedps:98
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.som.surrey.ac.uk/seeds/SEEDS98.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Talipova, Aminam & Parsegov, Sergei G. & Tukpetov, Pavel, 2019. "Russian gas exchange: A new indicator of market efficiency and competition or the instrument of monopolist?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gas Act; Ofgas; DGGS; Regulation; Auctions; Storage.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sur:seedps:98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Mona Chitnis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eesuruk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.