Voucher Privatization : A Detour on the Road to Transition?

We explore an overlooked aspect of the design of the Czech voucher privatization programme, namely, the consequences of allowing individuals to distribute their vouchers among the voucher privatization funds (VPFs). We develop and analyse a model of voucher privatization in which we study the problem facing individuals who invest their vouchers in VPFs which, in turn, are able to use their skills to alter the performances of the firms in which they acquire shares. The VPFs have different skills and, by their bids and subsequent joint ownership patterns, affect the performances of the firms in their funds. We show that even in the case in which voucher holders have identical and full information, and wish to allocate their vouchers to the VPFs in a manner consistent with the maximization of economy–wide profit, a coordination failure generally prevents the implementation of this efficient outcome. Uncertainty, as well as differing payouts by the VPFs, is shown to exacerbate the problem. We conclude that there was an inherent flaw in the design of the Czech voucher scheme. JEL classification: D44, L33, P21, G11.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)