IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ssa/lemwps/2001-18.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Technology Strategies in the Knowldge Economy. The Licensing Activity of Himont

Author

Listed:
  • Fabrizio Cesaroni

Abstract

The exchange of technologies and technological knowledge - through joint-ventures, partnerships, licensing, cross-licensing, R&D contracts - and the upsurge of markets for technology are main features of the "knowledge-based" economy. Competitive strengths are shifting from technological aspects to different levels of competitive behaviour, and companies are gradually changing their aptitude towards technology trading and exchange. The aim of this paper is to discuss the extent of technology licensing in chemicals, and specifically of one large firm - Himont - widely involved in licensing its process technologies. By analysing this case study, this paper explores the motivations for technology licensing, the managerial solutions that Himont adopted for licensing its technologies, and the implications of this strategy in terms of antitrust policy. One of the main result emerging from the analysis is the role of external technology suppliers. By increasing the potential competition in the product market, they create incentives for incumbent firms to license-out their technologies, and earn profits in the market for technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Cesaroni, 2001. "Technology Strategies in the Knowldge Economy. The Licensing Activity of Himont," LEM Papers Series 2001/18, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2001/18
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2001-18.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David J. TEECE, 2008. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Transfer And Licensing Of Know-How And Intellectual Property Understanding the Multinational Enterprise in the Modern World, chapter 5, pages 67-87, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. N/A, 1968. "Chemical Process Plant : Innovation and the World Market," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 45(1), pages 29-51, August.
    3. Merges, Robert P. & Nelson, Richard R., 1994. "On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, September.
    4. Arora, Ashish & Gambardella, Alfonso, 1994. "The changing technology of technological change: general and abstract knowledge and the division of innovative labour," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 523-532, September.
    5. Arora, Ashish, 1996. "Contracting for tacit knowledge: the provision of technical services in technology licensing contracts," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 233-256, August.
    6. Ashish Arora & Andréa Fosfuri, 2000. "The Market for Technology in the Chemical Industry : Causes and Consequences," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 317-334.
    7. Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea, 2003. "Licensing the market for technology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 277-295, October.
    8. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Patel, Pari & Pavitt, Keith, 1997. "The technological competencies of the world's largest firms: Complex and path-dependent, but not much variety," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 141-156, May.
    10. Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea & Gambardella, Alfonso, 2001. "Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate Strategy," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 10(2), pages 419-451, June.
    11. Ashish Arora, 1995. "Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights And The Market For Know-How," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 41-60.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Emeric Henry & Carlos J. Ponce, 2008. "Waiting to Copy: On the Dynamics of the Market for Technology," Working Papers hal-01066192, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gambardella, Alfonso & Giuri, Paola & Luzzi, Alessandra, 2007. "The market for patents in Europe," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1163-1183, October.
    2. Henkel, Joachim, 2022. "Licensing standard-essential patents in the IoT – A value chain perspective on the markets for technology," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(10).
    3. repec:wip:wpaper:3 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Seongkyoon Jeong & Sungki Lee & Yeonbae Kim, 2013. "Licensing versus selling in transactions for exploiting patented technological knowledge assets in the markets for technology," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 251-272, June.
    5. Jean-François Sattin, 2016. "Exploring the survival of patent licensing: some evidence from French foreign agreements," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 610-630, June.
    6. Suma Athreye & Yong Yang, 2011. "Disembodied Knowledge Flows in the World Economy," WIPO Economic Research Working Papers 03, World Intellectual Property Organization - Economics and Statistics Division, revised Dec 2011.
    7. Lee, Jong-Seon & Park, Ji-Hoon & Bae, Zong-Tae, 2017. "The effects of licensing-in on innovative performance in different technological regimes," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 485-496.
    8. Catalina Martinez & Pluvia Zuniga, 2017. "Contracting for technology transfer: patent licensing and know-how in Brazil," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(6), pages 659-689, August.
    9. Lee, Honggi, 2023. "The heterogeneous effects of patent scope on licensing propensity," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(3).
    10. Lee Davis, 2006. "Licensing Strategies of the Enterprising - but Vulnerable - "Intellectual Property" Vendors," DRUID Working Papers 06-12, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    11. Arora, Ashish & Gambardella, Alfonso, 2010. "The Market for Technology," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 641-678, Elsevier.
    12. Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, 2006. "Patent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Firms' Incentives for Technology Licensing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(2), pages 293-308, February.
    13. Figueroa, Nicolás & Serrano, Carlos J., 2019. "Patent trading flows of small and large firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(7), pages 1601-1616.
    14. Barirani, Ahmad & Beaudry, Catherine & Agard, Bruno, 2017. "Can universities profit from general purpose inventions? The case of Canadian nanotechnology patents," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 271-283.
    15. Ming Li & Xiangdong Chen & Gupeng Zhang, 2017. "How does firm size affect technology licensing? Empirical evidence from China," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 112(3), pages 1249-1269, September.
    16. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2008. "Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization," Economics Working Papers 1254, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2014.
    17. Hermosilla, Manuel & Wu, Yufei, 2018. "Market size and innovation: The intermediary role of technology licensing," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 980-991.
    18. Scott Shane, 2002. "Selling University Technology: Patterns from MIT," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(1), pages 122-137, January.
    19. Fabian Gaessler & Dietmar Harhoff & Stefan Sorg & Georg von Graevenitz, 2024. "Patents, Freedom to Operate, and Follow-on Innovation: Evidence from Post-Grant Opposition," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 494, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    20. Dushnitsky, Gary & Klueter, Thomas, 2017. "Which industries are served by online marketplaces for technology?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 651-666.
    21. Keld Laursen & Solon Moreira & Toke Reichstein & Maria Isabella Leone, 2017. "Evading the Boomerang Effect: Using the Grant-Back Clause to Further Generative Appropriability from Technology Licensing Deals," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 514-530, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2001/18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/labssit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.