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The Social Value of Information: A Test of a Beauty and Non-Beauty Contest

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  • Thomas Lustenberger
  • Dr. Enzo Rossi

Abstract

We develop and apply a procedure to test the welfare implications of a beauty and non-beauty contest based on survey forecasts of interest rates and yields in a large country sample over an extended period of time. In most countries, interest-rate forecasts are unbiased and consistent with both models, but are rarely supported by yield forecasts. In half of the countries, a higher precision of public information regarding interest rates increases welfare. During forward guidance, public information is less precise than private information.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Lustenberger & Dr. Enzo Rossi, 2017. "The Social Value of Information: A Test of a Beauty and Non-Beauty Contest," Working Papers 2017-17, Swiss National Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2017-17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Lustenberger & Enzo Rossi, 2020. "Does Central Bank Transparency and Communication Affect Financial and Macroeconomic Forecasts?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(2), pages 153-201, March.
    2. Monica Jain & Christopher S. Sutherland, 2020. "How Do Central Bank Projections and Forward Guidance Influence Private-Sector Forecasts?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(5), pages 179-218, October.
    3. Hwang, In Do & Lustenberger, Thomas & Rossi, Enzo, 2021. "Does communication influence executives’ opinion of central bank policy?☆," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    4. Ngomba Bodi, Francis Ghislain & Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Soulemanou, Soulemanou, 2020. "Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ? [Central Bank's Transparency and effectiveness of ," MPRA Paper 116436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. In Do Hwang & Dr. Enzo Rossi, 2020. "Does communication influence executives' opinion of central bank policy?," Working Papers 2020-17, Swiss National Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Value of information; beauty contest; interest rate forecasts; bond yield forecasts; strategic forecasts; central bank transparency; forward guidance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other

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