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A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results

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  • Giovanna Bimonte

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno)

Abstract

TThe formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanna Bimonte, 2013. "A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results," Working Papers 3_230, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno.
    • Handle: RePEc:sep:wpaper:3_230
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo & Yamazaki, Akira & 山崎, 昭, 2004. "On Blocking Coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind," Discussion Papers 2004-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    2. Schmeidler, David, 1972. "A Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 579-580, May.
    3. Allan Muir & Nicholas C. Yannelis & Dionysius Glycopantis, 2001. "An extensive form interpretation of the private core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(2), pages 293-319.
    4. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1983. "A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary communication structure," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 43-55, January.
    5. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2005. "Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 173-183, Springer.
    6. Okuda, Hidesuke & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1985. "Core allocations and the dimension of the cone of efficiency price vectors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 166-171, February.
    7. Grodal, Birgit, 1972. "A Second Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 581-583, May.
    8. GREENBERG, Joseph & WEBER, Shlomo & YAMAZAKI, Akira, 2004. "On blocking coalitions : linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Vind, Karl, 1972. "A Third Remark on the Core of an Atomless Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(3), pages 585-586, May.
    10. Allen, Beth, 1993. "4. Market Games with Asymmetric Information : Verification and the Publicly Predictable Information Core," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 34(Special I), pages 101-122, December.
    11. Giovanna Bimonte & Maria Graziano, 2009. "The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 331-350, February.
    12. M. Ali Khan, 1974. "Some Equivalence Theorems," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 549-565.
    13. Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1973. "Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 467-501, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential information economy; restriction on coalition formation; private core.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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