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On the Risk of Using a Firm-Level Approach to Identify Relevant Markets

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Abstract

In a recent influential paper Coate et al. (2020) have criticized the standard firm-level approach to market definition in merger review. They argue why a market-level approach to critical loss is more appropriate than a firm-level critical loss analysis. Their conclusion is that under certain plausible demand scenarios - i.e., non-linearity of demand functions - a diversion-based firm-level analysis could easily reach the wrong answer on market definition. We extend their analysis by showing that in standard environments used by the most recent theoretical and empirical academic work on merger analysis (namely CES and logit demand functions), a firm level approach actually leads to an excessively narrow market definition as opposed to a market-level approach, thereby increasing the risk of type I errors.

Suggested Citation

  • Timo Autio & Jorge Padilla & Salvatore Piccolo & Pekka Sääskilahti & Lotta Väänänen, 2020. "On the Risk of Using a Firm-Level Approach to Identify Relevant Markets," CSEF Working Papers 581, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:581
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    1. Thisse, Jacques-François & Fujita, Masahisa, 2002. "Agglomeration and Market Interaction," CEPR Discussion Papers 3362, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Elhanan Helpman & Paul Krugman, 1987. "Market Structure and Foreign Trade: Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026258087x, December.
    3. Masahisa Fujita & Paul Krugman & Anthony J. Venables, 2001. "The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262561476, December.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 667-690, September.
    5. Christopher Conlon & Julie Holland Mortimer, 2021. "Empirical properties of diversion ratios," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 693-726, December.
    6. Michael D. Whinston, 2008. "Lectures on Antitrust Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731878, December.
    7. Volker Nocke & Nicolas Schutz, 2018. "Multiproduct‐Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Games Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 523-557, March.
    8. Simon P. Anderson & Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2020. "Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short‐run and long‐run analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 470-495, June.
    9. Reiss, Peter C. & Wolak, Frank A., 2007. "Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization," Handbook of Econometrics, in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 64, Elsevier.
    10. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Coate, Malcolm B. & Ulrick, Shawn W. & Yun, John M., 2021. "Tailoring critical loss to the competitive process," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Critical Loss Analysis; Firm- and Market-level approach; Mergers; Non-linear Demand.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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