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Money and Credit in a Production Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Pighi Braila

    (CSEF, Università di Salerno, and CORE, UCL Belgium)

  • Francesco Magris

    (Università di Trieste and University of Cambridge, UK))

Abstract

In this paper we combine liquidity constrained lenders and borrowers in a market for investment projects that is characterized by incomplete information. The assumption of different probability distributions of the investment projects creates an adverse selection problem which gives rise to credit rationing in the loan market. Monetary policy has real effects, interacts with both the degree of liquidity and the degree of credit rationing, and alters the aggregate level of capital stock and its marginal productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Pighi Braila & Francesco Magris, 2000. "Money and Credit in a Production Economy," CSEF Working Papers 46, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:46
    as

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    File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp46.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bencivenga, Valerie R. & Smith, Bruce D., 1993. "Some consequences of credit rationing in an endogenous growth model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 97-122.
    2. Azariadis Costas & Smith Bruce D., 1993. "Adverse Selection in the Overlapping Generations Model: The Case of Pure Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 277-305, August.
    3. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 77-114.
    4. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    credit rationing; cash-in-advance constraints; investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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