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Relative Payoffs and Evolutionary Spite --- Evolutionary Equilibria in Games with Finitely Many Players

Author

Listed:
  • Christiane Clemens
  • Thomas Riechmann

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Christiane Clemens & Thomas Riechmann, 2003. "Relative Payoffs and Evolutionary Spite --- Evolutionary Equilibria in Games with Finitely Many Players," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 98, Society for Computational Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf3:98
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Riechmann, Thomas & Weimann, Joachim, 2008. "Competition as a coordination device: Experimental evidence from a minimum effort coordination game," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 437-454, June.
    2. Thomas Riechmann, 2005. "Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices," Game Theory and Information 0503010, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary Games; Evolutionary Equilibria; Spiteful Behavior; Relative Payoff;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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