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Corruption Bias and Information: A Study in the Lab

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Abstract

Our study examines whether actual corruption, measured by individuals direct experience of corruption episodes (bribery), matches their perceptions of the phenomenon. Our experimental participants play a repeated public good game with mandatory minimum contribution and are given the possibility to bribe a computerized bureaucrat in order to free-ride. We elicit beliefs about the perceived level of corruptibility of the bureaucrat and others’ corruption attempts. We study participants’ willingness to corrupt and the gap between perceived and actual corruption under two information conditions. Results show that, although anonymous, spreading news about an attempt of corruption is enough to discourage such attempts, lowering the corruption rate. Consequently, when receiving no information, participants expect others to corrupt more, raising the index of perceived corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Germana Corrado & Luisa Corrado & Francesca Marazzi, 2021. "Corruption Bias and Information: A Study in the Lab," CEIS Research Paper 505, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 12 Jan 2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:505
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Perceived and Experienced Corruption; Lab Experiment; Information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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