IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rtv/ceisrp/191.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Auctions versus Negotiations: Evidence from Public Procurement in the Italian Healthcare Sector

Author

Abstract

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on auctions and negotiations. Using healthcare facilities data on procurement contracts, I find evidence that auctions do not yield lower prices than negotiations. This result is robust to specifications tackling quality differences, endogenous participation, and the bilateral and multilateral nature of negotiated procedures. I also find evidence that late payments reduce competition and thus affect firms’ participation choices. A simple test based on Benford’s Law is used to rule out collusion among participants as a possible explanation of the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Mercedes Vellez, 2011. "Auctions versus Negotiations: Evidence from Public Procurement in the Italian Healthcare Sector," CEIS Research Paper 191, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 29 Mar 2011.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:191
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP191.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. G. Crea & A. Cavaliere & A. Cozzi, 2019. "Price discrimination in the Italian medical device industry: an empirical analysis," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(2), pages 571-608, July.
    2. Michal Kvasnicka & Rostislav Stanek & Ondrej Krcal, 2015. "Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 4, pages 241-257, December.
    3. Vincenzo Atella & Francesco Decarolis, 2024. "Procuring medical devices: evidence from Italian public tenders," International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 14(2), pages 103-121.
    4. Andrey Yakovlev & Aleksandra Bashina & Olga Demidova, 2014. "The effectiveness of simple homogeneous commodity procurement under rigid govermental regulation: the case of granulated sugar procurement in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 13/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. Simona Baldi & Davide Vannoni, 2014. "The Impact of Centralization, Corruption and Institutional Quality on Procurement Prices: An Application to Pharmaceutical Purchasing in Italy," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 379, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; negotiations; procurement; medical technology; competition; endogeneity; collusion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • C36 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:191. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Barbara Piazzi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csrotit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.