Don't Leave the Regulator Alone in the Commons: How Fishing Cooperatives Can Help Ameliorate Inefficiencies
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More about this item
Keywords
Common-pool resource; regulation; artisanal organization; flexible policy; inflexible policy; inefficiencies;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENV-2022-02-21 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2022-02-21 (Regulation)
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