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Interessengruppen und Economic Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Zimmermann, Klaus W.

    (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

  • Horgos, Daniel

    (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

Abstract

Taking Macur Olson's theory of the decline of nations as pathbreaking in this field we develop a formal model of the behavior of interest groups and their interaction to win some deeper insights into the interior mechanics of the interest-group-state. Followed by a brief survey of empirical studies testing Olson's theory, we at the first time in the literature present a time-series analysis of data from the German lobby-list and estimate macro-variables as economic growth and inflation using data on the number of interest groups between 1973 and 2006. Based on these theoretical and empirical results we conclude our study with some integrative reflections on the future of interest groups and the nation-state under the pressure of globalization and a footloose new economy

Suggested Citation

  • Zimmermann, Klaus W. & Horgos, Daniel, 2007. "Interessengruppen und Economic Performance," Working Paper 59/2007, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2007_059
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    Cited by:

    1. Beckmann Klaus & Gerrits Carsten, 2009. "Armutsbekämpfung durch Reduktion von Korruption: eine Rolle für Unternehmen? / Fighting poverty by fighting corruption: A task for private enterprise?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 60(1), pages 463-494, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; interest groups; economic performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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