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Problemas de competencia en la asignación de la capacidad de los aeropuertos. El Caso Argentino

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Listed:
  • Briggs, María Cristina

    (Universidad Argntina de la Empresa)

  • Petrecolla, Diego

    (Universidad Argntina de la Empresa)

Abstract

Este trabajo estudia el papel que juegan los mecanismos de asignación de la capacidad limitada de los aeropuertos (slots) en Aeroparque sobre la competencia en el mercado aéreo de cabotaje. Este trabajo encuentra que el mecanismo actual de reuniones utilizado en Aeroparque dificulta la entrada de nuevos competidores a las rutas y produce asignaciones ineficientes de los slots. Se propone entonces un mecanismo de subasta inicial seguida de un mercado de slots que permitirá reforzar el proceso competitivo buscado con la desregulación del transporte aéreo de cabotaje en los noventa

Suggested Citation

  • Briggs, María Cristina & Petrecolla, Diego, 2001. "Problemas de competencia en la asignación de la capacidad de los aeropuertos. El Caso Argentino," UADE Textos de Discusión 24_2001, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:uadetd:2001_024
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competencia en el mercado aéreo de cabotaje; asignaciones ineficientes de los slots;

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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