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Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Juuso Toikka

    (Stanford University)

  • Ilya Segal

    (Stanford University)

  • Alessandro Pavan

    (Northwestern University)

Abstract

two mechanisms that implement the same allocation rule must yield the same expected payoffs to the agents and hence the same expected revenue regardless of the transfer scheme and of the information disclosed by the mechanism to the agents. We then use the result as a tool for designing profit maximizing mechanisms. As an example of the applications we analyze the problem of designing a profit-maximizing sequence of auctions when the bidders' types follow a linear AR(1)-process.

Suggested Citation

  • Juuso Toikka & Ilya Segal & Alessandro Pavan, 2008. "Revenue Equivalence, Profit Maximization, and Information Disclosure in Dynamic Mechanisms," 2008 Meeting Papers 564, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:564
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    Cited by:

    1. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso V‰lim‰ki, 2010. "The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 771-789, March.
    3. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.
    4. Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2011. "Dynamic regulation of quality," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(2), pages 246-265, June.
    5. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2010. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 303, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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