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The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Wojciech Olszewski
  • Johannes Horner

Abstract

"Selection in Dynamic Games" 1. Assortative Matching with costly search, presented by Alp Atakan 2. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion, presented by Peter Eso 3. Noisy evolution in Normal form Games, presented by Christoph Kuzmics 4. The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring presented by Johannes Horner Abstract: We study repeated games in which monitoring is imperfect and private. We prove the folk theorem for all two-player (finite) games assuming that the monitoring is almost perfect, but not necessarily almost public

Suggested Citation

  • Wojciech Olszewski & Johannes Horner, 2004. "The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring," 2004 Meeting Papers 475, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed004:475
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/horner/folktheorem.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    imperfect private monitoring; repeated games;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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